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This paper addresses three complementary themes in bringing about responsive and 
accountable public governance in developing countries—namely globalisation, 
localisation and a results oriented management and evaluation (ROME). The first theme 
recognises interdependencies in an interconnected world and discusses how these 
influences would shape partnership within and across nations. The second theme is 
concerned with public sector realignments within nations to meet the challenges 
associated with heightened expectations from an informed citizenry. The third theme 
relates to creating a new culture of public governance that is responsive and accountable 
to citizens. The paper argues that a road to ROME holds significant promise of 
overcoming the ills of a dysfunctional, command and control, overbearing and rent 
seeking public sector in many developing countries. ROME de-emphasises traditional 
input controls and instead is concerned with creating an authorising environment in 
which the public officials are given the flexibility to manage for results but are held 
accountable for delivering public services consistent with citizen preferences. Further 
under ROME incentive mechanisms induce public and non-public (private and non-
government) sectors to compete in the delivery of public services and match public 
services with citizen preferences at lower tax cost to society per unit of output. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
“Government is the coldest of all cold monsters—whatever it says it lies—and 
whatever it has—it has stolen”. —  F. Nitzsche 
This paper is written as a tribute to the distinguished career of Dr Mahbub-ul 
Haq. Dr Haq’s ideas steered international development community away from a 
focus on lending volumes and towards concerns for results on the ground in human 
and institutional development. This paper provides practical guidance on furthering 
the governance reform agenda articulated by Dr Haq.   
The paper addresses three complementary themes in bringing about responsive 
and accountable governance in developing countries—namely globalisation,  
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localisation and a results oriented management and evaluation (ROME). The first 
theme recognises interdependencies in an interconnected world and discusses how 
these influences should shape partnerships within and across nations. The second 
theme is concerned with public sector realignments within nations to meet the 
challenges associated with heightened expectations from an informed citizenry. The 
third theme relates to creating a new culture of governance that is responsive and 
accountable to citizens. 
Globalisation, information revolution and localisation are exercising profound 
influences on economic governance in both the industrialised and the industrialising 
world. With globalisation, it is increasingly apparent that “nation states are too small 
to tackle large things in life and too large to address small things”. More simply, 
nation states are fast loosing control of some of their areas of traditional control and 
regulation such as regulation of external trade, telecommunications, and financial 
transactions. Globalisation is also making small open economies vulnerable to the 
whims of the large hedge funds and polarising the distribution of income in favour of 
skilled workers and widening income disparities. With the information revolution, 
governments are experiencing diminished control in their ability to control the flow 
of goods and services, ideas and cultural products. Localisation is also leading 
simultaneously to citizen empowerment in some areas while strengthening local 
èlites in others. Results oriented management and evaluation (ROME) is slowly 
exposing the bureaucratic and political culture to citizen/customer orientation and 
accountability for results. This paper analyses the potentials and perils associated 
with the impact of these mega changes on the governance structure in the 21st 
century. It further distills lessons from this experience to capitalise on this mega 
change to bring about improvement in public sector governance in developing 
countries. 
 
2.  SPECIAL CHALLENGES ARISING 
FROM GLOBALISATION 
Globalisation represents the transformation of world into a shared space 
through global links in economics, politics, technology, communications and law. 
This global interconnectedness means that events in one part of the world can have 
profound influence over the rest of the world.  Such links introduce growing 
decoupling of production in manufacturing and services from location, increasing 
permeability of borders and diminished influence of national policy instruments. 
Increasing internationalisation of production has decoupled firms from the factor 
endowments of any single nation.  Drucker (1986, p. 21) noted three fundamental 
decoupling of the global economy [see also Courchene (1993)]: 
  •  The primary sector has become uncoupled from the industrial economy; Governing for Results 
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  • In the industrial sector itself, production has become uncoupled from 
employment; and 
  • Capital movements rather than trade in goods and services have become the 
engines and the driving force of the world economy. 
As globalisation marches on it is introducing a mega change that exposes the 
fragility of existing systems of global governance. It is adversely impacting national 
welfare states that have incentives linked to national production. The sheer 
magnitude of this social and economic change makes it difficult for governments and 
individuals to cope with its consequences especially those nations and individuals 
who suffer from a reversal of fortune as a result of this change. In the following, we 
discuss the implications of this mega change for governance within nations.   
 
Decline of the Nation State, Emergence of Supranational 
  Regimes and Strengthening of Localisation 
Globalisation of economic activity poses special challenges to constitutional 
assignment within nations.  With globalisation, it is increasingly becoming apparent 
that nation states are “too small to tackle large things in life and too large to address 
small things”. Strange (1996) argues that “the impersonal forces of world markets… 
are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over 
society and economy is supposed to belong…the declining authority of states is 
reflected in growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and 
to local and regional bodies” [see Held et al. (1999), p. 3]. More simply, nation states 
are fast loosing control of some of their areas of traditional control and regulation 
such as regulation of external trade, competition policy, telecommunications, and 
financial transactions. National governments are experiencing  diminished control in 
their ability to regulate and/or control the flow of goods and services, ideas and 
cultural products.  For example, the East Asian financial crisis manifested a 
behaviour on the part of financial institutions and hedge funds which would have 
been subject to regulatory checks within nation states. The role of large hedge funds 
in destabilising national currencies and lending behaviour of industrialised countries, 
banking institutions to Indonesian financial institutions in the pre-crisis period with 
insufficient collateral for loans serve as striking examples of practices which would 
not have been permitted on internal transactions within a nation state [see Whalley 
(1999)]. Similarly, an enhanced mobility of capital limits government’s ability to tax 
capital incomes especially in the presence of fierce tax competition to attract foreign 
direct investment in most developing countries. Taxation of capital income is also 
increasingly being constrained due to inability to trace cross border transactions. For 
example, it would be difficult for the Government of Japan to tax income of a stock 
broker who deals with trading of British securities on the Brussels stock exchange.  Anwar Shah 
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Opportunities for multinationals to indulge in transfer pricing to limit tax liabilities 
are also expanding. While the internet commerce has exploded, bringing these 
activities within the tax reach presents itself as a difficult task even for industrialised 
countries. Thus the ability of governments to finance public goods especially those of 
redistributive nature may be impaired as governmental access to progressive income 
taxes (corporate and personal income taxes) is reduced while its access to general 
consumption taxes (VAT) is improved with economic liberalisation and global 
integration. The possible erosion of the taxable capacity of governments through 
globalisation and tax competition might be considered a welcome change by citizens 
of the countries with poor record of public sector performance in the provision of 
public services as is the case in most developing countries. Globalisation implies that 
not much is “overseas” any longer and that “homeless” transnational corporations 
have the ability to circumvent traditional host or home country regulatory regimes.  
These difficulties are paving way for the emergence of specialised institutions of 
global governance such as the World Trade Organisation, Global Environmental 
Facility with many more to follow, especially institutions to regulate information 
technology, satellite communications, and international financial transactions. For 
countries facing economic crisis and seeking international assistance, even in areas of 
traditional economic policy, the clout of international development finance 
institutions to influence local decision-making, is on the rise. Globalisation is 
therefore gradually unbundling the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality 
and state power [see Ruggie (1993)]. This transformation implies that governance 
and authority will get diffused to multiple centres within and beyond the nation state. 
Thus nation states would be confederalising in the coming years and relinquishing 
responsibilities in these areas to supranational institutions. 
 
Information Revolution and Citizen Empowerment  
With information revolution, “the ability to collect, analyse and transmit data, 
and to coordinate activities worldwide has increased massively, while the cost of 
doing so have fallen dramatically” [Lipsey (1997), p. 76]. Firms now have the ability 
to ‘slice up the value added chain’ [Krugman (1995)] to gain international 
competitiveness. The information revolution empowers citizens to access, transmit 
and transform information in ways that governments find themselves powerless to 
block and in the process it undermines authoritative controls. It also constrains the 
ability of governments to withhold information from its citizens. Globalisation of 
information—satellite TV, internet, phone and fax—serve also to enhance citizens’ 
awareness of their rights, obligations, options and alternatives and strengthens 
demands both for devolution (power to the people) and localisation of decision-
making. Consumer sovereignty and citizen empowerment through international 
coalitions on specific issues work as countervail to global capital. The influence of Governing for Results 
 
389 
such coalitions is especially remarkable on environmental issues such as large dams 
and sealing industry.      
 
Consumer Sovereignty and Democracy Deficit 
In the emerging borderless world economy, interests of residents as citizens 
are often at odds with their interests as consumers. This is because internationali-
sation of production empowers them as consumers as performance standards are set 
by the market rather than by bureaucrats. It disenfranchises them as citizen-voters as 
their access to decision-making is further curtailed as decision centres both in public 
and private sectors move beyond nation state creating a ‘democracy deficit’. For 
example a citizen in a globalised world has no direct input into vital decisions 
affecting his well-being that are made at the headquarters of either the supranational 
agencies and regimes such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank or the 
World Trade Organisation or transnational corporations such as Coca-Cola and 
McDonald. Similarly, the European Union Parliament is only indirectly accountable 
to citizens of Europe. In securing their interests as consumers in the world economy, 
individuals are increasingly seeking localisation and regionalisation of public 
decision-making to better safeguard their interests. 
 
Internationalisation of Cities and Regions 
With greater mobility of capital, and loosening of regulatory environment for 
foreign direct investment, local governments as providers of infrastructure related 
services  would serve as more appropriate channels for attracting such investment 
than national governments.  As borders become more porous, cities are expected to 
replace countries in transnational economic alliances as people across Europe are 
already discovering that national governments have diminishing relevance in their 
lives. They are increasingly more inclined to link their identities and allegiances to 
cities and regions.  For example, the Alpine Diamond alliance that links Lyon with 
Geneva and Turin, has become a symbol for one of  Europe’s most ambitious efforts 
to break the confines of the nation-state and shape a new political and economic 
destiny.  
 
Knowledge and International Competitiveness 
With mobility of capital and other inputs, skills rather than resource 
endowments are increasingly determining international competitiveness. Skilled 
labour especially in “symbolic-analytic” services [Reich (1991) identifies these as 
problem-solving, problem-identifying and strategic brokerage services] qualifies to 
be treated as capital rather than labour. Courchene (1996) argues that for resources to 
remain important, they must embody knowledge or high value added techniques.  Anwar Shah 
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These developments imply that even resource rich economies must make a 
transformation to human capital based economy and that social policy is no longer 
distinguishable from economic policy. Education and training typically, however, are 
sub-national government responsibility. Therefore, there would be a need to realign 
this responsibility by giving the national government a greater role in skills 
enhancement.  The new economic environment will also polarise the distribution of 
income in favour of skilled workers accentuating income inequalities and possibly 
wiping out lower middle income classes. Since the national governments may not 
have the means to deal with this social policy fallout, sub-national governments 
working  in tandem with national governments would have to devise strategies in 
dealing with the emerging crisis in social policy. 
 
A Potential Source of Conflict within Nations 
International trade agreements typically embody social and environmental 
policy provisions. But these policies are typically the responsibility of sub-national 
governments. This is an emerging area of conflict among different levels of 
government as national decisions in foreign relations affect the balance of power 
within nations. To avoid these conflicts, a guiding principle should be that to the 
extent these agreements embody social and local environmental policy provisions 
they must be subject to ratification by sub-national governments as is currently the 
practice in  Canada.  
 
Reorienting State as a Countervail to Globalisation 
The progress of globalisation has created a void in the regulatory environment 
and weakened the ability of small open economies to deal with external shocks [Rodrik 
(1997)]. Such external shocks typically lead to major disruptive influences on social 
safety nets, income distribution and the incidence of poverty as witnessed recently in 
the East Asian crisis. This leads to enhanced demand for public spending especially for 
social protection and redistribution. Globalisation also empowers skilled workers to 
command a greater premium. Courchene (1993) has argued that this will result in the 
wages of unskilled workers falling to a “global maximum” wage rate as they are 
replaced by cheaper workers elsewhere. Firms may resort to “social dumping” i.e. 
reduced income security and social safety net benefit support to retain international 
competitiveness. This places a greater burden on the public sector for social protection. 
Rodrik’s empirical work [see Rodrik (1998)] for OECD countries provides some 
support for this view as he finds that economic liberalisation was positively associated 
with social security and welfare expenditures. The widening gap in the incomes of 
skilled vs unskilled labour arising from globalisation has the potential  for bi-
polarisation of incomes and disappearance of lower middle income class. Thus Rodrik  Governing for Results 
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(1997a) has warned that the resulting social disintegration will ultimately erode the 
domestic consensus in favour of open markets to a point that one might see a resurgence 
of protectionism around the globe. Some reversals on economic liberalisation were 
observed in response to recent financial crisis in several countries. Some developing 
countries’ governments have attempted to dampen these shocks by introducing capital 
controls (e.g. Malaysia) and attempting to strengthen social safety nets with 
international assistance (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand).  The role of supranational 
agencies in dealing with competition policy, regulating short-term capital movements 
and oversight on the activities of the hedge funds is currently under debate. 
The information revolution may also allow national governments to be more 
responsive to the needs of their citizens and limit demands for decentralisation. This 
is because the information revolution is leading to a decrease in transaction costs and 
therefore lowering of costs to correct for information asymmetries and of writing and 
enforcing better contracts [see Eid (1996)]. Hart (1995) has argued that in such a 
world organisational form is of lesser consequence and therefore the need for 
decentralised institutions is diminished. 
In conclusion, globalisation by no means implies a demise of the nation state 
but rather a reorientation of the nation state to deal with more complex governance 
structure of an interconnected world. Leaders in some countries might even visualise 
a more activist state role in sanding the wheels of global capital markets to deal with 
social and economic policy fall-outs, as experienced in East Asia. 
 
3. SPECIAL CHALLENGES ARISING FROM LOCALISATION 
A large and growing number of countries around the globe are re-examining 
the roles of various levels of governments and their partnership with the private 
sector and the civil society with a view to creating governments that work and serve 
their people [see Shah (1998) for motivations for such a change]. The overall thrust 
of these changes manifests a trend towards either devolution (empowering people) or 
localisation (decentralisation). Localisation of authority has proved to be a 
controversial proposition. This is because localisation is being perceived both as a 
solution to problems such as dysfunctional public sector, lack of voice and exit as 
well as source of new problems such as capture by local elite, aggravation of 
macroeconomic management due to lack of fiscal discipline and perverse fiscal 
behaviour by sub-national units. There are also conceptual difficulties in making 
choices on the right balance as discussed in the following paragraphs [see Boadway 
Roberts and Shah (1994) for further details].    
 
Conceptual Issues 
The choice of the degree of centralisation versus localisation on the 
expenditure side, and the precise means by which central governments achieve their  Anwar Shah 
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desired influence, will vary from expenditure type to expenditure type. It will involve 
a trade-off between the benefit of localisation, which include catering to local 
preferences, the ability to provide services at low cost and creating incentives to 
innovate, against the benefit of centralisation, which include preservation of internal 
common market, achievement of national equity, internalisation of inter-state 
spillovers and the provision of national public goods and services. Different 
observers and societies will have different views about the ideal balance and the 
ways the tradeoffs can be overcome. On the tax side, while fiscal responsibility 
dictates that responsibilities for taxation be decentralised to allow sub-national 
governments the ability to finance at least some of their own expenditures, this 
decentralisation leads unavoidably to inequities and inefficiencies. The magnitude of 
these is greater the higher the degree of decentralisation. The solution to this may 
partly lie in retaining some control of the tax structure in the hand of the national 
government. This will induce greater harmonisation of the tax system among various 
levels of governments thereby contributing to the efficiency of the national economy 
and reducing the costs of tax collection. It will also facilitate the national 
government’s pursuit of its redistributive objectives through the tax system. On the 
other hand, the national government can undo some of the inefficiencies and 
inequities of decentralised tax and expenditure systems  through its use of fiscal 
transfers to sub-national governments. This will be particularly true for inefficiencies 
and inequities arising from net fiscal benefit differentials across sub-national units. 
In general, the role of the national government relative to sub-national 
governments is predicated on the provision of national public goods and services, the 
maintenance of the efficiency of internal common market and the pursuit of 
redistributive equity nationwide. The importance of the latter determines to a great 
extent the degree of centralisation of a nation. Equity objectives influence the role 
that the national government should assume in the direct tax system and the system 
of transfers. They also have a bearing on the national government’s interest in the 
provision of quasi-private goods and services such as education and health, many of 
which serve a redistributive purpose. And the national government’s interest in 
equity affects its use of the intergovernmental transfer system to influence the way in 
which sub-national governments behave and to redistribute resources among sub-
national jurisdictions in an equalising manner. In other words, the extent of the role 
of the national government is largely determined by its interest or lack thereof in 
redistributive matters [see Shah (1994) for a framework and guidelines for an optimal 
assignment of responsibilities]. 
Beyond these conceptual issues, a number of practical considerations have a 
bearing on the quest for balance within a nation. These include the level of popular 
participation in general elections, feudal politics, civil service culture and incentives, 
governance and accountability structure and capacities of local governments.  
 Governing for Results 
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Practical Challenges in Institutional Design  
Localisation brings new challenges in institutional design and development to 
deal with (a) fragile governance with political and constitutional asymmetries; (b) 
securing economic union; (c) ensuring fiscal discipline under fend-for-yourself 
federalism; and (d) political and bureaucratic incentives and the culture of command 
and control and rent seeking. These issues are briefly discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
(a) Fragile Governance with Political and 
     Institutional Asymmetries 
Governance structure remains fragile in many parts of the world. This explains 
the emergence of more than 50 new countries since World War II. Political asymmetry 
arises from a unit in the federation assuming unequal status due to its population size or 
economic base or ethnic character of its population. To overcome this inequality, 
several solutions are tried. These include redrawing of boundaries as done several times 
in its short history in Pakistan; creating a second chamber with equal representation 
from member units (US Senate) or equal representation of member governments (as in 
Germany and RSA); and having formal fiscal equalisation programmes (as in Australia, 
Canada and Germany). In addition, constitutional solutions that provide increased 
central powers in some units (e.g. provision of the President’s rule in the Indian 
Constitution), increased regional autonomy for some (as for the Catalonia region in 
Spain and States of Sabah and Sarawak in the Malaysian Federation); de-facto 
asymmetry though opting in/out as in Canada or through bilateral agreements as in the 
Russian Federation, have also been tried. 
Pakistan represents an interesting example in this regard.  Political asymmetry 
has been continuing source of tension in Pakistan and response has been to redraw 
boundaries periodically. At its birth, the country was divided into five provinces with 
East Pakistan commanding a population share of 54 percent. In 1961, four provinces 
of West Pakistan were merged into one unit to counterbalance the dominant position 
of East Pakistan. One unit was subsequently dismembered with the fall of the 
military rule. In 1971, the majority province (East Pakistan—now Bangladesh) was 
forced to secede as East Pakistan’s dominating party, Awami League, won a plurality 
in parliamentary elections but was not allowed to form a government.  Even now 
since Punjab commands a majority of the population, its size is not conducive to a 
dialogue among equals in the federation. Further the boundaries of the provinces in 
Pakistan simply represent a legacy of the British empire and thereby serve as a source 
of conflict and polarisation of public opinions. To reduce these tensions, it may well 
be that Pakistan may be forced to redraw internal boundaries in future once again by 
breaking up the size of existing provinces perhaps along the lines represented by 
various administrative divisions.   
 Anwar Shah 
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(b) Securing Economic Union  
Several dimensions of securing an economic union in a federal system have 
relevance for macroeconomic governance: preservation of the internal common 
market; tax harmonisation; transfers and social insurance; intergovernmental 
transfers and regional fiscal equity. These are briefly discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
(i) Preservation of the Internal Common Market 
Preservation of an internal common market remains an important area of concern 
to most nations undertaking decentralisation. Sub-national governments in their pursuit 
of attracting labour and capital may indulge in beggar-thy-neighbour policies and in the 
process erect barriers to goods and factor mobility. Thus decentralisation of government 
regulatory functions creates a potential for disharmonious economic relations among 
sub-national units.  Accordingly, regulation of economic activity such as trade and 
investment is generally best left to the federal/central government. It should be noted, 
however, that central governments themselves may pursue policies detrimental to the 
internal common market. Therefore, as suggested by Boadway (1992), constitutional 
guarantees for free domestic flow of goods and services may be the best alternative to 
assigning regulatory responsibilities solely to the centre. 
The Indonesian constitution embodies a free trade and mobility clause. But in 
a large majority of developing countries, internal common market is impeded both by 
sub-national government  policies supported by the centre as well as formal and 
informal impediments to labour and capital mobility. For example, in India and 
Pakistan, local governments rely on a tax on intermunicipal trade (octroi tax) as the 
predominant source of revenues. In China, mobility rights of individuals are severely 
constrained by the operation of “hukou” system of household registration which is 
used to determine eligibility for grain rations, employment, housing and health care. 
 
(ii) Tax Harmonisation and Coordination 
Tax competition among jurisdictions can be beneficial by encouraging cost-
effectiveness and fiscal accountability in provincial/state governments. It can also by 
itself lead to a certain amount of tax harmonisation. At the same time, decentralised 
tax policies can cause certain inefficiencies and inequities in a federation as well as 
lead to excessive administrative costs. Tax harmonisation is intended to preserve the 
best features of tax decentralisation while avoiding its disadvantages. 
Inefficiencies from decentralised decision-making can occur in a variety of 
ways. For one, states may implement policies which discriminate in favour of their 
own residents and businesses relative to those of other states.  They may also engage 
in beggar-thy-neighbour policies intended to attract economic activity from other 
states. Inefficiency may also occur simply from the fact that distortions will arise 
from different tax structures chosen independently by state governments with no Governing for Results 
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strategic objective in mind. Inefficiencies also can occur if state tax systems adopt 
different conventions for dealing with businesses (and residents) who operate in more 
than one jurisdiction at the same time.  This can lead to double taxation of some 
forms of income and non-taxation of others. State tax systems may also introduce 
inequities as mobility of persons would encourage them to abandon progressivity. 
Administration costs are also likely to be excessive in an uncoordinated tax system 
[see Boadway, Roberts and Shah (1994)]. Thus tax harmonisation and coordination 
contribute to efficiency of internal common market, reduce collection and 
compliance costs and help to achieve national standards of equity. 
 
(iii) Transfer Payments and Social Insurance 
Along with the provision of public goods and services, transfer payments to 
persons and businesses comprise most of government expenditures (especially in 
industrialised countries). Some of these transfers are for redistributive purposes in the 
ordinary sense, and some are for industrial policy or regional development purposes. 
Some are also for redistribution in the social insurance sense, such as unemployment 
insurance, health insurance and public pensions. Several factors bear on the 
assignment of responsibility for transfers.  In the case of transfers to business, many 
economists would argue that they should not be used in the first place.  But, given 
that they are, they are likely to be more distortionary if used at the provincial level 
than at the federal level.  This is because the objective of subsidies is typically to 
increase capital investments by firms, which is mobile across provinces.  As for 
transfers to individuals, since most of them are for redistributive purposes, their 
assignment revolves around the extent to which the federal level of government 
assumes primary responsibility for equity. From an economic point of view, transfers 
are just negative direct taxes. One can argue that transfers should be controlled by the 
same level of government that controls direct taxes so that they can be integrated for 
equity purposes and harmonised across the nation for efficiency purposes. The case 
for integration at the central level is enhanced when one recognises the several types 
of transfers that may exist to address different dimensions of equity or social 
insurance. There is an advantage of coordinating unemployment insurance with the 
income tax system or pensions with payments to the poor. Decentralising transfers to 
individuals to the provinces will likely lead to inefficiencies in the internal common 
market, fiscal inequities and interjurisdictional beggar-thy-neighbour policies. 
 
(iv) Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
Federal-provincial transfers in a federal system serve important objectives: 
alleviating structural imbalances, correcting for fiscal inefficiencies and inequities, 
securing economic union through setting national minimum standards and fiscal  Anwar Shah 
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equalisation, providing compensation for benefit spill-outs and achieving 
stabilisation and fiscal harmonisation. The most important critical consideration is 
that the grant design must be consistent with grant objectives [see Shah (1994, 
1998)].  
In industrialised countries, two types of transfers dominate: conditional 
transfers to achieve national standards and equalisation transfers to deal with 
regional equity.  In developing countries, with a handful of exceptions, conditional 
transfers are of pork-barrel (PB) variety and equalisation transfers with an explicit 
standard of equalisation are not practised.  Instead, “passing-the-buck” (PTB) 
transfers in the form of tax-by-tax sharing and revenue sharing with multiple 
factors and “asking-for-more-trouble” (AMT) grants that finance deficits, are used. 
With limited or no tax decentralisation, PTB and AMT type transfers in 
developing world finance the majority of sub-national expenditures. In the 
process, they build transfer dependencies and discourage development of 
responsive and accountable governance [see Shah (1997)]. In general, these 
transfers create incentives for sub-national governments to undertake decisions 
that are contrary to their long run economic interests in the absence of such 
transfers.  Thus they impede natural adjustment responses leading to a vicious 
cycle of perpetual deprivation for less developed regions [see also Courchene 
(1996) and Shah (1996) for a further discussion].           
Properly structured transfers can enhance competition for the supply of public 
services, accountability of the fiscal system and fiscal coordination just as general 
revenue sharing has the potential to undermine it. The role of fiscal transfers in 
enhancing competition for the supply of public goods, in particular, should not be 
overlooked.  For example, transfers for basic health and primary education could be 
made available to both public and not-for-profit private sector on equal basis using as 
criteria, the demographics of the population served, school age population and 
student enrolments etc. This would promote competition and innovation as both 
public and private institutions would compete for public funding. Chile permits 
Catholic schools’ access to public education financing. Canadian provinces allow 
individual residents to choose among public and private schools for the receipt of 
their property tax dollars. Such an option has introduced strong incentives for public 
and private schools to improve their performances and be competitive. Such 
financing options are especially attractive for providing greater access to public 
services in rural areas. 
 
(v)  Regional Fiscal Equity 
Regional inequity is an area of concern for decentralised fiscal systems and most 
such systems attempt to deal with it through the spending powers of the national 
government or through fraternal programmes. Mature federations such as Australia, 
Canada and Germany have formal equalisation programmes. This important feature of Governing for Results 
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decentralisation has not received adequate attention in the design of institutions in 
developing countries. Despite serious horizontal fiscal imbalances in a large number of 
developing countries, explicit equalisation programmes are untried, although 
equalisation objectives are implicitly attempted in the general revenue sharing 
mechanisms used in Brazil, Colombia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan. These 
mechanisms typically combine diverse and conflicting objectives into the same formula 
and fall significantly short on individual objectives. Because these formulas lack 
explicit equalisation standards, they fail to address regional equity objectives 
satisfactorily.  
 
(c) Ensuring Fiscal Discipline Under Fend-for-Yourself Federalism 
Ensuring fiscal discipline represents an important challenge for all developing 
countries. A federal system due to the presence of multiple principal agents poses 
special demands to ensure that all principals follow the rules of the game. In this 
context, underlying framework must ensure that the governments at all levels are 
made to face financial consequences of their decisions. This is done by establishing 
an independent central bank with the sole mandate of price stability. An independent 
central bank with the sole mandate of price stability is likely to bring discipline to 
public spending by holding the line on central bank advances to governments and by 
ensuring the integrity and independence of financial markets. The latter requires that 
governments must not be allowed to own financial institutions or to have a 
preferential access to these institutions. 
Fiscal policy coordination also represents an important challenge. In this 
context, Maastricht guidelines on deficit and debt or the fiscal rules imposed in 
Brazil provide useful frameworks but not necessarily a solution to this challenge. 
Industrialised countries’ experience shows that federally imposed controls and 
constraints typically do not work. Instead, societal norms based on fiscal 
conservatism such as the Swiss referenda and political activism of the electorate 
play important roles. Ultimately capital markets and bond-rating agencies provide 
more effective discipline on fiscal policy. In this context, it is important not to 
backstop state and local debt and not to allow ownership of the banks by any level 
of government. Reduced reliance on revenue sharing and increased reliance on 
own revenues and on conditional block transfers would bring greater 
accountability. Tax decentralisation is also important to establish private sector 
confidence in lending to local governments and sharing in the risks and rewards of 
such lending. Transparency of the budgetary process and institutions, 
accountability to the electorate and general availability of comparative data 
encourages fiscal discipline. Finally a societal consensus on the roles and limits of 
all governments and periodic reviews of these roles is essential to keep a check on 
deviant behaviours of governments.  
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(d)  Political and Bureaucratic Culture and Incentives 
In some developing countries, political and bureaucratic culture remains 
focused on command and control with little concern and almost no accountability for 
delivery of public services. Establishing citizens’ charters and bringing results 
orientation through new contractualism and managerialism, as discussed at length in 
a subsequent section, can be of some help.  
 
Decentralisation—Fine in Theory but What is the Practice? 
Some writers have cautioned against a shift in division of powers in favour of 
sub-national governments in a developing country environment and have highlighted 
the “dangers of decentralisation” [Prud’homme (1995), also see Tanzi (1996)]. These 
authors have expressed concerns ranging from macro mismanagement, corruption, 
red tape, and widening gulf between rich and poor persons and regions under 
decentralised fiscal system. These concerns have been analysed by Shah (1998) and 
Huther and Shah (1998) among others and found to have weak empirical basis as the 
record of decentralised fiscal systems on all these issues is better than that of 
centralised fiscal systems.  Table 1 from Huther and Shah (1998) shows a strong 
degree of positive association among governance quality indices and the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation. It is further surprising to note that about 38 percent of the 
variance in governance quality is explained by fiscal decentralisation alone.  
 
Table 1 
Correlation of the Decentralisation Index with Governance Quality Indicators 
(Sample Size: 80 Countries) 
   Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Citizen Participation    
Political Freedom    0.599** 
Political Stability   0.604** 
Government Orientation    
Judicial Efficiency    0.544** 
Bureaucratic Efficiency    0.540** 
Absence of Corruption    0.532** 
Social Development    
Human Development Index    0.369* 
Egalitarianism in Income Distribution  
(Inverse of Gini coefficient) 
  
0.373* 
Economic Management    
Central Bank Independence    0.327* 
Debt Management Discipline 
(Inverse of Debt to GDP Ratio) 
  
0.263 
Openness of the Economy (Outward Orientation)    0.523** 
Governance Quality Index   0.617** 
Source: Huther and Shah (1998). 
          * Significant at the 0.05 percent level (2-tailed test). 
        ** Significant at the 0.01 percent level (2-tailed test). 
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4.  ON GETTING THE GIANT TO KNEEL:  APPROACHES TO 
A CHANGE IN THE BUREAUCRATIC CULTURE 
 
A Primer on Results Oriented Management 
   and Evaluation (ROME) 
Public sector continues to face a crisis of public confidence in both 
industrial and non-industrial countries. Examples of government inefficiency and 
waste abound in most countries. For example in the USA, the Federal Aviation 
Administration still relies upon dinosaur computers with green screens that run on 
vacuum tubes. These computers are estimated to impose $3 billion in wasted 
aircraft fuel, delays, missed connections and labour costs. The U.S. Defense 
Department (Pentagon) has in the past paid $89 for a $1 screwdriver and the US 
Department of Agriculture until recently had 2700 words specification of “French 
fries”. Of course, these examples pale in comparison to grand theft carried out by 
“roving political and bureaucratic bandits” in developing countries.   In industrial 
countries, citizens are expecting their governments to do more with less. In 
developing countries on the other hand fairly fundamental dysfunctionality of 
public governance remain areas of major concern. In these countries, a government 
is either seen as predatory or even criminal. In some countries, the concept of 
citizenship or civic responsibility does not exist and effective management of state 
in this context means that ruling elite doles out benefits to its personalised client 
networks. Perceptions about some governments as  “the coldest of all cold 
monsters—whatever it says it lies—and whatever it has—it has stolen” and others 
which simply exist to extract rents may not be very far from truth.   
A major difficulty in these countries is that public theft by “roving bandits” 
encourages capital and skilled labour flight leading the economy to a state of collapse 
so that not much is left for either the roving bandit or his subjects unless external 
help is available. But external help aggravates the temptations of such a bandit as 
he/she has a short time horizon. It helps if such a bandit makes the country a home 
and becomes a “stationary bandit” as in such circumstances, the time horizon of the 
ruler expands and his/her fortune gets tied with the fortune of the nation. This 
explains the reason why in the countries ruled by roving bandits, people show a great 
deal of tolerance for military coup d’etat. Such transformation typically leads to a 
short period of tranquility but little improvement in the quality of life in the long run. 
The record of industrialised countries shows that democratic participation is the only 
form of government with a consistent record in ensuring good governance. This is 
because only the democratic form of government ensures property rights and 
enforcement of contracts. Democratic governance, however, cannot simply be 
mandated from above. Putnam (1993, p. 172), in Making Democracy Work, argues 
“that democratic institutions cannot be built from top down. They must be built in the Anwar Shah 
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everyday traditions of trust and civic virtue among its citizens.” Localisation and 
accountability for results helps in building such trust and virtue.        
Over the years, industrial countries have shown a remarkable change in the 
performance of their public sectors. It is interesting to note that this change was 
brought about not through a system of hierarchical controls, as is the focus in most 
developing countries, but more through strengthened accountability to citizens at 
large.  The elected representatives made a commitment along the lines the oath 
required of the members of the City of Athens which stated that:  
“We will strive increasingly to quicken the public sense of public duty; 
That thus … we will transmit this city 
Not only not less, but greater, better and more beautiful 
Than it was transmitted to us”. 
This accountability for results was further strengthened by accountability of 
executive to the legislative branch. Overall the emphasis of these systems of 
accountability has been to bring about a change in both bureaucratic culture and 
incentives public employees face. This cultural change during the 1990s has been 
brought about by strengthening results orientation to the public sector. This is done by 
steering attention away from internal bureaucratic processes and input controls (hard 
controls) to accountability for results (soft controls). While various countries have 
followed diverse policies to achieve this transformation, the underlying framework 
driving these reforms is uniform and firmly grounded in the results oriented 
management  and evaluation  (ROME) framework. Under ROME, a results based chain 
provides a yardstick for measuring public sector performance. Such a focus in 
management dialogue reinforces joint ownership and accountability of the principal and 
the agent in achieving shared goals by highlighting terms of mutual trust. 
 
Results Oriented Management and Evaluation Chain: 
Programme/projectÎ inputs Î activitiesÎ outputs Î reachÎoutcome (purpose) Î impact (goal) 
ÎCitizen feedback and evaluationsÎ Programme design Î Programme / Project  
Most ROME related approaches have the following common elements: 
  • Contracts/work programme agreements based upon pre-specified output and 
performance targets and budgetary allocations. 
  •  Managerial flexibility but accountability for results. 
  • Subsidiarity  principle. 
  •  Incentives for cost efficiency. 
  • Citizen  charter,  bottom-up accountability. 
Results-oriented management and evaluation (ROME) provides a coherent 
framework for strategic planning and management based upon learning and  Governing for Results 
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accountability in a decentralised environment. The key to successful implementation of 
ROME is through the transparency achieved by the public commitment to a few but 
vital expected outcome results, based on the agency’s outcome related strategic goals. 
Thus internal and external reporting shifts from the traditional focus on inputs to that of 
outputs, reach and outcomes, in particular, outputs that lead to results. Further, these 
results are themselves now stated in terms of development achievements. Programmes, 
activities, processes and resources are thus aligned with the strategic goals of the agency 
and flexibility in project definition and implementation is achieved through a shift in 
emphasis through strict monitoring of inputs to performance results and their 
measurements. Tracking progress towards expected results is done through indicators, 
which are negotiated between the provider and the financing agency. This joint goal 
setting and reporting helps ensure client satisfaction on an on-going basis while 
building partnership and ownership into the project. 
The ROME reforms within an institution are underpinned by devolution and 
delegation of authority. However, this requires a two-way flow of information, 
achieved through a strengthened accountability mechanism in the form of 
performance reporting, greater emphasis on monitoring and evaluation of results, 
and individual performance agreements which focus on results. Thus under 
ROME, accountability becomes positive and forward looking, based upon 
continuous and systematic feedback and learning. That is each unit provides 
information on results achieved against the agency’s strategic goals allowing for 
benchmark comparisons and learning across organisational boundaries. In 
addition, it also provides senior management with concrete evidence on which to 
base allocation decisions. Thus devolution, participation and accountability are all 
important aspects of this process. 
Under ROME, budget allocations support contracts/work programme 
agreements based upon pre-specified outputs and performance targets. Managerial 
flexibility in input selection including hiring and firing of personnel and programme 
execution is fully respected but at the same time they are held accountable for achieving 
results. The subsidiarity principle of lowest level assignment of responsibility unless a 
case can be made for higher level assignment strengthens accountability for results 
while enhancing consistency of public service provision with local preferences. Finally, 
under a ROME framework, cost efficiency is rewarded through retention of savings. 
For calculation of costs, activity based costing including charges for capital/asset use 
are required. As the focus of the approach is on learning, failure to meet commitments 
may be tolerated  but a failure to share values invites severe sanctions.  
 
Implications of ROME for Civil Service Reform 
Civil servants in developing countries are typically poorly paid for the work 
rendered but instead receive high perks and further enrich themselves  through  graft  Anwar Shah 
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and corruption. They have life-long tenures. Innovation and risk taking is not 
tolerated. In an attempt to limit graft, strong input controls and top-down 
accountability is enforced. In addition, senior civil servants are rotated periodically 
from one position to another. But such practices weaken accountability further. A 
ROME framework, in contrast, calls for competitive wages and task specialisation 
(“stay-with-it culture”), and lack of formal tenures. Public providers are given the 
freedom to fail or succeed. Instead public employees hold the jobs so long as they are 
able to fulfill the terms of their contracts. Persistent failures initiate the exit process.  
Responsiveness to citizenry and accountability for results are the cornerstone of this 
approach. The ROME framework offers a great potential in developing countries to 
improve public sector governance by nurturing a responsive and accountable 
governance. It may also prove to be one of the most potent weapons against 
bureaucratic corruption and malfeasance. A recent empirical study on the 
determinants of corruption  by Gurgur and Shah (1999) supports this view as it 
shows that political and bureaucratic culture and centralisation of authority 
represented the most significant determinants of corruption in a sample of 30 
countries. They further find that raising public sector pay and wages as part of an 
anti-corruption strategy is not likely to yield any gains in reducing corruption.         
 
Experience with Rome 
Several countries have experimented with various versions of ROME. Of 
these, experiences of New Zealand, Canada and Malaysia offer interesting insights as 
discussed below:  
 
The State Under Contract: The New Zealand Model 
The New Zealand model represents one of the boldest experience in 
transforming the public sector by using a private sector management and 
measurement approach to core government functions. To introduce a cultural change 
from input controls to output accountability in the public sector, New Zealand, 
during the past decade, revamped a tenured civil service and instead made all public  
 
Box 1. Making the Dog Wag its Tail 
Current Future 
Input controls  Results matter 
Top-down accountability  Bottoms-up accountability 
Low wages but high perks  Competitive wages but little else 
Life-long and rotating appointments  Stay-with-it-culture but exit with persistent failures 
Intolerance for risk/innovation  Freedom to fail/succeed.Governing for Results 
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positions contractual based upon an  agreed set of  results. Even the central bank 
governor was required to enter into a contract with the parliament. Under the terms of 
this contract, the tenure of the central bank governor was linked to inflation staying 
within a band of 3 percent per annum. The policy development and implementation 
functions, financing, purchasing and providing functions were separated. This 
enabled the government to focus on policy and financing and bringing the private 
sector in partnership with public sector in the provision function. Programme 
management was decentralised at delivery points and managers were given the 
flexibility and autonomy in budgetary allocations and programme implementation 
within the policy framework and the defined budget. Capital charging and accrual 
accounting were introduced to have a complete picture on the resource cost of each 
public sector activity. Non public functions were either commercialised or privatised. 
Responsible fiscal management was encouraged through requirement of maintaining 
positive net worth of the government as part of the contract by the Minister of 
Finance. 
The new contractualism version of ROME introduced by New Zealand led to 
a remarkable transformation of the Kiwi economy. It was transformed from a highly 
protected and regulated economy with an expansive range of intrusive and expensive 
interventions, to an open and deregulated economy with a lean and efficient public 
sector. [see Walker (1996)].  The central government deficits were eliminated, debt 
reduced and the government net worth became positive while improving the quantity 
and quality of public services. Even more remarkable results were achieved at the 
local level. For example, the Mayor of Papakura by introducing new contractualism 
brought an astonishing turnaround to the fortunes of the town of Papakura by 
eliminating debt and reducing taxes while improving the quality and quantity of 
public service provision. 
To be sure there were limited social policy fall-outs with this approach. Social 
service provision to minority communities experienced some difficulties as cost 
cutting pressures under commercialisation occasionally led to curtailed access by 
minority communities. In isolated cases, new contractualism failed as bureaucratic 
incompetency failed to ensure strict safety standards as witnessed in the collapse of a 
newly constructed viewing platform at Cave Creek that resulted in deaths of scores of 
tourists.  
 
Getting Government Right—The Canadian Approach 
Canada in 1994 adopted its own version of ROME to deal with persistent 
public sector deficits, a large overhang of debt and growing citizen dissatisfaction 
with the public sector. Canada rejected new contractualism and instead opted for the 
so-called alternative service delivery framework (ASD) for public sector reforms 
using the so-called new managerialism approach. The ASD represents a dynamic  Anwar Shah 
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consultative and participatory “process of public sector restructuring that improves 
the delivery of services to clients by sharing governance functions with individuals, 
community groups, the private sector and other government entities”.  
As part of the programme review process under the ASD, departments and 
agencies were required to review their activities and programmes against the 
following guidelines. 
Six Guidelines of Programme Review 
 1.  Public Interest Test—Does the programme area or activity continue to serve 
a public interest? 
 2.  Role of Government Test—Is there a legitimate and necessary role for the 
government in this programme area or activity? 
 3.  Federalism Test—Is the current role of the federal government appropriate, 
or is the programme a candidate for realignment with the provinces? 
 4.  Partnership Test—What activities or programmes should or could be 
transferred in whole or in part to the private/voluntary sector? 
 5.  Efficiency Test—If the programme or activity continues, how could its 
efficiency be improved? 
 6.  Affordability Test—Is the resultant package of programmes and activities 
affordable within the fiscal constraints? If not, what programmes or activities 
would be abandoned?   
The Canadian experience with ASD to-date has shown remarkable results. 
Federal deficit was cut from 7.5 percent of GDP in 1993 to a balanced budget in 
1998. The number of federal departments were reduced from 38 to 25 and the civil 
service size was reduced from 220K to 178K. Allocations to social services, justice 
and science and technology were increased while the remaining services saw a 
reduction in the budgetary allocations. Citizen-centred service delivery enhancements 
were achieved through clustering of services around the needs of citizens, regulatory 
reform to encourage competition and innovation, cost recovery from services 
benefiting special segments, and continuing re-evaluation of programmes to support 
alternative service delivery mechanisms.  The overall impact of these reforms was an 
improvement in service delivery and citizen satisfaction.  
 
From Government to Governance in Malaysia  
ROME was not built in a day and, as discussed earlier, there is now abundant 
literature on the ROME type innovations pioneered by New Zealand, Australia, and 
Canada among others.  Interesting enough, this literature has not fully recognised the 
contribution of Malaysia where some of the innovations predate the experience in 
industrial countries. Malaysian experience is of special relevance to developing 
countries as Malaysian public sector suffered at least some of the dysfunctionality of  Governing for Results 
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public sector as experienced in other developing countries in late 1980s. Thanks to 
some bold initiatives undertaken by Ahmad Sarji under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Mahatir Mohammed, Malaysia had a significant degree of success in getting 
the public sector giant to kneel so that citizens can get aboard. 
Since early 1990s, Malaysia has gradually put in place aspects of results-oriented 
management to create a responsive and accountable public sector governance structure. 
Various elements of this approach that have been implemented  are: 
  •  Missions and values: All public agencies are required to specify their mission 
and values with a view to justifying their roles and to inculcate positive 
values in public administration.  
  •  Strengthening client orientation: A Client’ Charter was established in 1993.  
This charter requires all agencies to identify their customers and establish 
their needs. Agencies are further required to notify clients about standards of 
services available. Public agencies are expected to report annually both on 
service improvements and compliance failures. A corrective action is 
required to deal with compliance failures. Clients have a right to redress 
through the Public Complaints Bureau.  
  •  Managerial flexibility with strong accountability for results: This is achieved 
through the implementation of an output based budgeting system and activity 
based accounting system. It has further introduced capital charging and 
accrual accounting. The output budgeting system requires “programme 
agreements” for delivery of outputs but permits managerial flexibility in 
achieving agreed upon results. Performance indicators for government 
agencies and other public service providers are maintained.  
  •  Decentralised decision-making. Malaysia has overtime sought to strengthen 
decentralised decision-making by strengthening local governments and by 
deconcentrating federal government functions. 
  •  Strengthening the integrity of the Malaysian civil service: Malaysia has one 
of the strongest anti-corruption law and devotes significant resources to 
implement this law. 
  •  Partnership approach to service delivery.  A partnership approach to service 
delivery is attempted through ensuring contestable policy advice, 
deregulation and active promotion of public-private collaboration in public 
services. 
  •  Ensuring financial integrity. This is achieved through internal and external 
audit. The Auditor General provides the Parliament with a financial integrity 
audit. This report is widely disseminated.          
In sum, Malaysia is at the cutting edge of public sector institutional 
development, innovation and performance in developing countries. It has followed  Anwar Shah 
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innovative approaches to improve public sector performance. Its challenge is to 
strengthen the new culture of governance that it has attempted to create by dealing 
with implementation issues thorough training and corrective action. In addition it 
needs to start addressing some of the issues that have received inadequate attention 
so far. These include (a) strengthening central bank independence and focusing its 
role solely on price stability; and  (b) achieving a better integration of development 
and operating budget processes.   
 
Beyond ROME—Measuring Performance  
   When There is No Bottom Line 
The whole of government performance monitoring is of interest to get an 
overall measure of public sector performance and citizen accountability of the 
political regime. Such measurement is becoming increasingly popular in industrial 
countries. The State of Oregon, USA set up an independent board to develop and 
monitor measures of  social well-being  (158 such measures in 1991 now reduced to 
20 in 1999) of state residents. The State of Florida initially established 268 indicators 
dealing with progress in families and communities, safety, learning, health, economy, 
environment and government. It has more recently abandoned this effort. The 
Province of Alberta, Canada, has established 27 “measuring up” quality of life 
indicators. New Zealand reports on the net worth of the government. UN publishes 
human development indicators and Huther and Shah (1998) developed 
comprehensive indicators of the quality of governance incorporating citizen 
participation, government orientation, social development and economic 
management  for  a sample of 80 countries. 
The experience with the whole of government performance measurement  has 
shown mixed results. This is because media is skeptical about the accuracy of the 
statistics and the legislatures in political systems with separation of executive and 
legislative powers, are concerned with the potential abuse of this tool to undermine 
legislative authority. In general in the absence of major crisis, politics of budgetary 
decision-making reduces the usefulness of these performance indicators.  A major 
difficulty with aggregate performance indicators arises from “looking for keys under the 
lamp post reflex” meaning that what may be measurable and is measured may not be 
relevant for policy or accountability purpose. Outcome measures at conceptual level 
offer diffused accountability. Instead the focus on outputs and reach as practised in New 
Zealand and Malaysia offers greater potential for accountability for results.    
 
Epilogue—ROME—A Road Map to Wrecks 
   and Ruins or to a Better Tomorrow? 
The success of ROME in practice in a few selected countries has invited a 
heated controversy and debate among public sector management practitioners with a  Governing for Results 
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fairly vocal group  [Schick (1998), is the leading exponent of this viewpoint] arguing 
against application of such principles in developing countries. A plethora of arguments are 
put forward to support this view. It has been argued that the real issue of civil service reform 
is not its efficiency but its underdevelopment. Input control systems are not well developed. 
There is no sense of public responsibility and as a result managerial discretion will enhance 
opportunities for abuse of public office for private gain. Due to political interference, 
potential for contract enforcement is quite weak. The use of ROME will further weaken top 
down accountability as the focus changes to results rather than inputs, rules and procedures. 
It is further argued that the use of this approach will not work for craft (research and 
development) and coping (e.g. disaster relief) organisations as the focus on outputs will 
discourage innovation, risk taking and timeliness of the response. In social services, it is 
argued that access to the needy and the poor may not be assured under a system which 
places high premium on operational efficiency. Finally, others have argued that ROME is a 
fad and developing countries should simply wait it out until a newer fad emerges.   
While there is some merit in the arguments advanced against the use of ROME, but 
on balance, the case for application of ROME in developing countries is further 
strengthened in view of the institutional weaknesses highlighted above. The underdeveloped 
bureaucracy and input controls argument suggests that modern accounting systems that trace 
the flows of inputs have not proved helpful. This is because the experience shows that 
performance improvement gains from the implementation of such systems have been 
minimal and instead these systems provide a cover for the abuse of public funds by 
facilitating “getting the books in order”. As outputs for a large majority of public services 
are readily observable and their reach can be measured, ROME provides a much better 
handle on accountability in governance in weak institutional environments. Hierarchical 
input based accountability has typically failed to deliver public sector mandates. Indeed craft 
and coping organisations require care in how their results—based chain is evaluated. In 
social services, similarly the designs of incentives are critical to forestall any fall-outs and 
instead encourage access to all through competition and innovation. For example, a grant 
structure that treats all providers—public and private—on equal basis with continuation of 
eligibility tied to conditions on the standards of services and access to such services rather 
than spending levels can overcome the moral hazard (see Box 2). ROME is of course not a 
fad either as it was practised with great success in traditional societies long before modern 
bureaucracy was invented. Even in personal and family decision-making ROME is the only 
approach typically taken by most individuals in decision-making e.g. building and fixing a 
home and seeking other services. Many developing countries facing large fiscal crisis and in 
the absence of external help would simply have no choice but to adopt ROME to vercome 
these crises to set their houses in order. In general  bottoms  up  accountability is the key to  Anwar Shah 
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the success of ROME and such accountability requires decentralised decision- 
making. In conclusion, globalisation, localisation and ROME offer a strong potential 
for improving public sector performance in developing countries.  
 
5.  MEGA CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
 
Emerging Jurisdictional Realignments 
The debate on globalisation and localisation and growing level of 
dissatisfaction with public sector performance is forcing a rethinking on 
assignment issues and to force a jurisdictional realignment in many countries 
around the globe. Box 3 presents a newer federalism perspective on the assignment 
of responsibilities by taking into account the considerations noted above.  This box 
shows that functions such as regulation of financial transactions, international 
trade, global environment, international migration will need to be passed upwards 
(centralised) beyond nation states, some sub-national functions such as training 
should have greater central government inputs (centralisation) and local functions 
should be completely decentralised and should involve greater participation by the 
civil society and the private sector. In developing countries, rethinking these 
arrangements has led to gradual and piecemeal decentralisation of responsibilities 
for local public services to lower levels in a small but growing number of 
countries. The development and strengthening of institutional arrangements for the 
success of decentralised policies has significantly lagged behind. Strengthening of 
local capacity for purchase or delivery of local services has received only limited 
attention.  Even strengthening of central and intermediate level functions required 
for the success of this realignment have not always materialised. In fact in some 
countries, decentralisation is motivated by shifting the budget deficit and 
associated debt burdens to sub-national governments. Bureaucratic resistance to 
the implementation of ROME type reforms remain strong and as a result not much 
improvements have been effected in developing countries.  
Box 2.  Education Grant to Encourage Competition and Innovation 
Allocation basis among local governments:  population aged 5–17. 
Distribution to providers: Equal per pupil to both government and private 
schools. 
Conditions: Universal access to primary and secondary education regardless of 
parents’ income. No condition on  the use of grant funds. 
Penalties: Public censure, reduction of grant funds. 




Emerging Governance Structure in the 21st Century 
While rearrangements taking place in the world today embody diverse features 
of supranationalisation, centralisation, provincialisation and localisation. Neverthe-less, 
the vision of a governance structure that is slowly taking hold is the one that indicates a 
shift from unitary constitutional structures in majority of the countries to federal or 
confederal constitutions for a major part of the world. It implies that we are likely to 
move from a centralised to a globalised and localised world. The role of the central 
governments in such a world would change from that of a managerial authority to a 
leadership role in a multi-centred government environment. The culture of governance 
is also slowing changing from a bureaucratic to a participatory mode of operation; from 
command and control to accountability for results; from being internally dependent to 
being competitive and innovative; from being closed and slow to being open and quick; 
and from that of intolerance from risk to allowing freedom to fail or succeed. Financial 
crisis around the world are hampering this change and as a result the new vision will 
take  some  time  to  shape  in  the  21st  century (see Table 2) and  in  many  developing  
 
Table 2 
Governance Structure—20th Versus 21st Century 
     20th Century             21st Century 
♦  Unitary 
♦  Centralised 
♦  Centre manages 
♦  Bureaucratic 
♦  Top-down accountability 
♦  Focus on rules and procedures 
♦  Life-long appointments in civil service 
♦  Command and control 
♦  Internally dependent 
♦  Closed and slow 
♦  Intolerance of risk 
♦  Focus on government 
♦  Federal/confederal 
♦  Globalised and localised 
♦  Centre leads 
♦  Participatory 
♦  Bottoms-up accountability 
♦  Managerial flexibility but accountability 
for results 
♦  Contractualism 
♦  Responsive and Accountable 
♦  Competitive 
♦  Open and quick 
♦  Freedom to fail/succeed 
♦  Focus on governance 
Box 3.  
Emerging Rearrangements: Globalisation, Centralisation and Localisation 
Beyond Nation States: regulation of financial transactions, corporate taxation, 
international trade, global environment, telecommunications, international standards, 
international migration, surveillance of governance conditions, global security and 
risk management, transnational production, investment and technology transfer. 
Centralisation: Social and environmental policy through international 
agreements, skills enhancement for international competitiveness, social safety 
nets, oversight and technical assistance to sub-national governments. 
Regionalisation/Localisation/Privatisation: All regional/local functions. Anwar Shah 
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countries this vision may not actually materialise due to the conceptual and practical 
difficulties noted in the following sections. 
 
6.  WHY THE ROAD TO REFORM REMAINS A FIELD 
OF DREAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
  A simple way to see why the public sector is dysfunctional and does not 
deliver much in developing countries yet is difficult to reform, is to have a closer 
look at public sector mission and values, its authorising environment and its 
operational capacity. 
  (a)  Public sector mission and values.  Societal values and norms, e.g., as embodied 
in the constitution or in annual budget policy statements, may be useful points 
of reference for public sector mandates and the values inherent in these 
mandates.  Unwritten societal norms that are widely shared or acknowledged 
should also be taken into consideration.  In industrialised countries, the mission 
and values of the public sector are spelled out in terms of a medium term policy 
framework.  For example, there is a formal requirement in New Zealand that a 
policy statement of this type be tabled in the parliament by March 31 (about 2-3 
months in advance of the budget statement).  Public sector values in developing 
countries are rarely addressed.  This is because the orientation of the public 
sector remains towards “command and control” rather than to serve the 
citizenry.  For an official trained in ‘command and control’, the need to develop 
a code of conduct with a client orientation, may appear frivolous. 
  (b) Authorising environment.  This includes formal (budgetary processes and 
institutions) and informal institutions of participation and accountability.  Do 
these institutions and processes work as intended in providing an enabling 
environment for the public sector to meet its goals? Do various levels of 
government act in the spirit of the constitution in exercising their 
responsibilities? What are the checks and balances against deviant 
behaviour? Is the independence of the central bank, the judiciary, and the 
auditor general guaranteed?  Is the central bank focused solely on price 
stability or is it expected to pursue multiple objectives? Are there formal 
rules to ensure fiscal discipline? Is the design of transfers consistent with 
their objectives? Are there private agencies that rate various levels of 
government for their credit worthiness? Is public sector borrowing subject to 
financial market discipline? How is government performance measured? Are 
output and outcome indicators for public services monitored by any one?  In 
industrialised countries, institutional norms are strictly adhered to and there 
are severe moral, legal, voter and market sanctions against non-compliance.  Governing for Results 
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In a developing country environment, non-compliance is often neither 
monitored nor subject to any sanctions. 
  (c) Operational capacity and constraints.  What is authorised is not necessarily 
what will get done as the available operational capacity may not be consistent 
with the task at hand.  Further, even the operational capacity that is available 
may be circumvented by the bureaucratic culture or incentives that reward 
command and control, and corruption and patronage.  Some key questions, 
the answers to which will give a better understanding of operational capacity, 
include: Do the agencies with responsibility for various tasks have the 
capacity to undertake them? Do they have the right skills mix as well as the 
incentive to do the right things and to do them correctly? Is the bureaucratic 
culture consistent with the attainment of societal objectives? Are there 
binding contracts on public managers for output performance? Does 
participation by civil society help alleviate some of these constraints? To 
what extent can these constraints be overcome by government reorganisation 
and reform?  Whereas, in industrial countries, answers to most of the above 
questions are expected to be in the affirmative, this is not true in the case of a 
developing country.   
The challenge of public sector reform in any country is to harmonise the 
public sector’s mission and values, its authorising environment and its 
operational capacity so that there is a close, if not perfect, correspondence among 
these three aspects of governance (see Figure 1).  Such a task is daunting for 
many developing countries since they often have lofty goals, but lack an 
authorising environment that is capable of translating these goals into a policy 
framework.  This problem is often compounded further by bureaucratic incentives 












Fig. 1.  Public Sector Institutional Environment in Developing Countries. Anwar Shah 
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Table 3 presents a stylised comparison of the institutional environment in a 
primitive society, a developing country and an industrialised country. It is interesting 
to note that while technical capacity in the modern sense was non-existent in a 
traditional society, due to harmonisation of its goals, its authorising environment and 
its operational capacity, public sector outcomes were consistent with member 
preferences. The cultures of such societies more often than not focused on 
accountability for results.  The system of rewards and punishment was credible and 
swift and much of the business relations were based on informality and trust.  Thus 
while per capita GDP in such societies was quite low, member satisfaction with 
collective action, the so-called “viagara index” was observed to be high and quite 
possibly not too far behind the degree of satisfaction with public sector experienced 
in today’s industrial societies. 
 
Table 3 
Public Sector Institutional Environment—Stylised Facts 
  Traditional Society  Developing Country  Industrial Country 
Goals  Clear and realistic  Vague and grandiose  Clear and realistic 
Authorising Environment  Strong  Weak  Strong 
Operational Capacity  Consistent and 
functional 
Dysfunctional Consistent  and 
functional 
Evaluation Capacity  Strong  Weak   Strong 
Public Sector Orientation  Output  Input controls, 
  command and  
  control 
Input, output and   
  outcome 
  monitoring 
Public Sector Decision- 
  making  
Decentralised Centralised Decentralised 
Private Sector 
  Environment 
Informality and trust  semi-formality but 
lack of trust and 
disregard for rule of 
law 
Formal and legal 
Evaluation culture  Snakes and ladders “Gotcha”  Learning  and 
improving 
 
This contrast with the picture that can be portrayed for a typical developing 
country. In such a country, there is discordance in the society’s goals, authorising 
environment and operational capacity. As a consequence of this disharmony, not 
much gets accomplished and citizens expectations are belied. Lack of accountability 
and focus of the evaluation culture on frying a big fish occasionally but doing 
nothing with the systemic malaise means that any self-correcting mechanisms that 
may exist are blunted. Semi-formality imposes additional costs on doing business but 
does not lead to any benefits in business relations due to disrespect for law. Contracts 
may not be honoured and therefore carry little value. In view of this completely 
dysfunctional nature of public sector in many developing countries, it is important for  Governing for Results 
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these to leapfrog forward (or even backwards)  to a public sector culture that puts 
premium on client orientation and accountability for results. This is however, 
unlikely to happen soon for reasons to be discussed later. 
In the following section, we take a look at some of the factors that are at play 
in impeding the progress of realignment of functions and harmonisation of public 
sector mission, values, authorisation environment and operational capacity in 
developing countries.   
 
7.  WHY THE ROAD TO REFORM REMAINS A FIELD OF 
DREAMS? PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
We noted that public sectors in most developing countries require significant 
restructuring. Progress to-date on such reforms have been uneven.  A number of 
factors impede the progress of reform to varying degrees in various countries. 
 
Political Factors  
Political ownership is critical to the success of any reform. In Latin America 
and former centrally planned economies, emergence of democratic governance and 
political freedoms led to heightened interest in improvement of public sector 
performance and decentralisation of local public services was seen as an important 
element of this reform. In Latin America, disenchantment with military rule and 
dictatorships of various persuasions has led to creation of a political culture that 
places a premium on decentralised decision-making to forestall a return to the past. In 
China, decentralisation was seen as a means for social cohesion, faster economic 
growth and preservation of communist party rule.  Politics blocks reform in other 
countries. In Indonesia, forefathers of the constitution clearly intended it to be a 
centralised unitary country and dictated against establishment of “states within the 
state”. These concerns for political unity have dominated the design of institutions. 
Well entrenched roles of military and civil service in political affairs with a strong 
belief in command and control from the Centre have sustained centralisation of 
responsibility. Appointment of governors and mayors also strengthens centralisation 
and limits local autonomy. In recent years, however, social development and 
economic prosperity and concerns for improving the delivery of public services are 
bringing a degree of accommodation for decentralised institutions.    
In Pakistan, political instability and feudal interests have contributed to setting 
aside constitutional dictums and introducing a system of centralised governance. 
Pakistan has been under military rule for a major part of its existence (25 out of 52 
years) and decision-making was further centralised by these regimes. During the periods 
political activities were permitted, feudal influences dominated the political system and 
these influences favoured either a centralisation or provincialisation of authority. In 
rural areas of Sindh and Balochistan, and to a more limited extent in rural areas of  Anwar Shah 
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Punjab and NWFP provinces, feudal lords do not allow effective political participation. 
Centralisation or provincialisation of authority allows feudal lords to dominate politics 
at the federal and provincial levels. A centralised system allows these lords to have 
greater effective control than would be possible under a decentralised system where the 
urban sector would have a more significant voice. To further entrench feudal lords, 
under the leadership of the former Prime Minister Ms. Bhutto in 1994, local 
governments were disbanded in all metropolitan areas and not restored even when in 
1996 the Supreme Court of Pakistan found this practice to be in contravention of the 
law. Grants to members of national and provincial legislatures for development projects 
as practiced until 1997, may have worked against the development of local 
governments as these members enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in project 
execution in the absence of a well functioning system of local government.  
 
Bureaucratic Factors 
Many countries in Africa and Asia share a common colonial heritage.  The 
British, Dutch and French colonial systems instituted a system of bureaucratic 
control to achieve with maximum efficiency colonial objectives of a predatory state. 
The system created a core of civil service elite which was highly educated and highly 
dedicated to serving the colonial rulers. Their loyalty to rulers and detachment from 
the common man was duly rewarded by allowing them preferential access to all 
public services through elite institutions and by ensuring them financial security 
through a system of cash rewards and land grants. Thus colonised countries such as 
India, Kenya, Pakistan and Indonesia inherited civil service regimes that were highly 
centralised, seemingly efficient, accountable and professional but completely 
detached from local population. These regimes have remained resistant to change 
especially to bringing accountability for results. For example, after independence, in 
Indonesia, civil service over time became an active political partner with military in 
governing the country. Both partners viewed central control as a key element in 
holding this country of 14,000 islands together. A centralised regime also was 
conducive to capturing rents from private sector development.  Over time, 
nevertheless, they discovered that initial degree of centralisation was not sustainable 
and therefore substantial degree of autonomy to local governments while keeping a 
week structure of provincial governments, is necessary to improve delivery of local 
services. A gradual shift towards local control (localisation) is thus seen as posing no 
threat to national unity and to the preservation of a command and control oriented 
bureaucratic regime.  
 
Institutional Factors 
Institutional factors also impede effective decentralisation and adoption of 
ROME. Traditional institutions and mechanism of governance and accountability  Governing for Results 
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over time have withered away but these have not been replaced by newer institutions. 
Instead, all pervasive role of the state have retarded critical look at public policies 
and institutions. There is almost complete monopoly of the government on 
institutions of critical thought and media in many countries. Any critical review of 
government policies and programmes invites a government backlash. In Pakistan, 
rural self-government worked well in earlier days of its independence. This system 
was abandoned in favour of a more centralised system which has resulted in denial to 
rural population of access to basic services. While lack of institutional capacity was 
cited as a reason for disbandment of the participatory system, the newer system left a 
majority of citizens with no voice and participation and no access to basic public 
services. Indonesia, on the other hand, is now nurturing self-government in rural 
areas through its village development and poor villages grant programmes [see Shah 
(1996)]. 
Another important aspect of institutional factors is the citizens’ philosophy 
towards government. Do people generally (politicians, bureaucrats, public employees 
generally and the public/voter) view the public sector as one where one does service 
for fair compensation or a position to exploit for personal gain. Various opinion 
surveys suggest that the prevailing public perception about the public sector 
especially in South Asia and Africa tend to support the latter view and citizens tend 
to associate public sector with a predatory role. 
Contrary to common misconceptions, the success of decentralisation policies 
critically require a strong responsive and accountable government at the national 
level just as the success of centralised governance critically depends upon 
responsive, accountable and competent field offices of  the central government. This 
is the least understood “paradox of decentralisation (rearrangements)”. This suggests 
that centralisation requires a higher degree of local (field office) institutional capacity 
and competence and greater sophistication and integrity of public information 
monitoring, finance, accounts and audit systems than required under a decentralised 
system. The success of decentralised structures on the other hand critically depends 
upon the higher level enabling environment and citizen participation and less so on 
the local institutional capacity and information network as confirmed by the 
Colombian experience [see Fiszbein (1995)]. Local institutional capacity and 
information networks are no doubt important yet these can be overcome by 
borrowing such capacity from internal and external sources at least during the earlier 




Some external participants may also unwittingly impede development of a 
decentralised, responsive and accountable public sector in developing countries. A  Anwar Shah 
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multitude of factors contribute to this development. First, a centralised hierarchical 
system lowers transaction costs for external assistance and enlarges the comfort zone 
for external participants in terms of monitoring the utilisation of  their funds for 
intended purposes. Second, some external participants have concerned themselves 
with the revenue performance (so-called “resource mobilisation”) of developing 
countries. Such concerns may lead to larger centralised bureaucracies that pay little 
attention to efficient delivery of public services. For example in Pakistan, minor 
improvements in revenue performance of governments have in the past been 
accompanied by ever deteriorating quality and quantity of public services. Third, 
centralised systems are more prone to a lack of internal policy agenda due to a lack 
of citizen participation and more dependent on external advice on policy reform. 
Typically this leads to quick policy fixes with little sustained reform. 
 
8.  MAKING DREAMS COME TRUE: GETTING 
INSTITUTIONS RIGHT 
Adherence to federalism principles and ROME or “getting prices right” or even 
“getting the rules of the game right” as discussed earlier is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the success of decentralised decision-making. Complementary 
formal and informal institutions are needed to ensure that all players in the game adhere 
to agreed upon set of ground rules and deviant behaviour is properly dealt with. In the 
following, we discuss selected aspects of this consideration. 
 
Institutions and Processes of Intergovernmental Coordination 
Federal countries require both formal and informal institutions of 
intergovernmental coordination. In some federal countries,  areas of potential conflict 
among different levels of government is minimised through clear separation of 
national and sub-national responsibilities (the so-called layer-cake model of 
federalism as practised in Australia, Canada, India and Pakistan) and  the two levels 
interact through meetings of officials and ministers (executive federalism) and in 
Australia, India and Pakistan through federal unilateralism. Some countries place a 
greater premium on a common response through shared or joint tasks such as 
Germany, a federal country and the Republic of South Africa, a pseudo federal 
country. In these countries, in addition to executive federalism,  the upper houses of 
parliament (Bundesrat and the Council of Provinces) play a key role in 
intergovernmental coordination. In countries with overlapping responsibilities (the 
so-called marble cake model of federalism), such as United States and Brazil, state 
lobby of Congress and interstate relations serve coordinating roles. In China, where 
growth concerns have imposed a federalism structure on a unitary country, regional 
communist party bosses/ governors exercise a moderating influence on otherwise 
monolithic orientation of the State Council. Governing for Results 
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Constitutional provisions per se can also provide coordinating influences. For 
example, in some federal countries, constitutional provisions require that all 
legislation recognise that ultimate power rests with the people. For example, all 
legislation in Canada must conform to the Canadian Charter of Rights. In 
Switzerland, a confederation by law but a federal country in practice, major 
legislative changes require approval by referenda. In Switzerland, there is also a 
strong tradition of coordination through consensus initiatives by cantons. 
 
Institutions of Accountability 
The institution of accountability is the key to the success of decentralised 
decision-making. This entails institutions and mechanisms for citizens’ voice and exit, 
norms and networks of civic engagement (“social capital” according to Putnam 1994), 
social consensus [Williamson (1994) and Weingast (1993)], preservation instinct of a 
“stationary bandit” who monopolises and rationalises theft in the form of taxes [Olson 
(1993)],  judicial accountability,  vertical and horizontal accountability. The citizens’ 
voice and exit require institutions of democratic participation, and accountability 
provisions for elected officials. The origins and success of decentralisation programmes 
in Latin America is traceable to the democratic traditions that emerged in the continent 
in late 1980s. In Philippines, recently enacted local government legislation while 
empowering these governments have provided for regular elections and recall of elected 
officials for a breach of public trust [see the Republic of Philippines Act No. 7160, the 
Local Government Code (1991)]. While norms and networks of civic engagement were 
reasonably well developed in pre-colonial traditionalist societies found in many 
developing countries such as the Panchayat Raj in Pre-British India, these institutions 
withered away either under the colonial rule or subsequently under centralised 
bureaucratic governance structures. The net result has been rise of opportunism and 
social distrust culminating in dysfunctional societies when formal institutions of 
governance failed. The African and the South Asian development fiascoes share this 
common underpinning.  Societal consensus on economic and political rights is also 
conducive to accountability at all levels. According to Weingast (1993), this consensus 
need not take any formal expression but would work so long as a majority of people 
share a common belief as to the limits of governmental intervention and are willing to 
police those limits by withdrawing their support from a government that fails to abide 
by them [see Weingast (1993), p. 306].  Preservation instincts of a stationary bandit also 
respect accountability [see Olson (1993)]. This is because, the stationary bandit 
strengthens his grip on power, so long as economic performance is strong and citizens 
see their well being improved. This explains partly the success of the Asian Tigers and 
the failure of  some South/Southeast  Asian regimes. The latter regimes were controlled 
by “roving bandits” whose main aim was to make the loot to pad their Swiss bank 
accounts and then disappear in a foreign haven.   Anwar Shah 
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Judicial accountability strengthens the credibility of public commitments.  This 
is particularly important for transition economies, where framework laws on property 
rights, corporate legal ownership and control, bankruptcy, and financial accounting and 
control are not fully developed.  Interestingly enough, judicial accountability is much 
more difficult to enforce in a parliamentary democracy than in a democratic system 
which respects separation of legislative and executive functions. This is because, under 
a parliamentary democracy, the executive branch can override judicial accountability by 
amending the legislation—a game played ad infinitum in Pakistan to undermine a 
decentralised federal constitution.  Judicial accountability is further compromised under 
a British style civil service organisation as in India and Pakistan where divisional and 
district commissioners hold simultaneously executive, legislative and judicial powers.  
As noted by Montesquieu (1970, p. 397), such a situation is ripe for the abuse of 
powers as, 
 “ ... When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same body of 
magistrates, there can be no liberty;... Again, there is no liberty, if the 
judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive”.  
 
Traditional Channels of Accountability 
The audit, inspection and control functions should be strengthened, since they 
tend to be quite weak in transition and developing economies. The auditor-general 
should be given greater authority and autonomy in exercising his mandate. At the same 
time, a case can be made for loosening the constraints of the central planning process in 
developing countries. Central plans lead to a centralisation of authority, a reduction in 
flexibility, innovation and autonomy at the local level and delays in private sector 
activity. On a more specific point, as fiscal responsibility is decentralised to the state 
and local levels, it would be beneficial to create the institutional capacity for local 
borrowing so that more reliance is placed on borrowing and less on capital grants to 
finance capital projects. Examples include loan councils or municipal finance 
corporations. 
 
Oversight of Local Governments: Freedom 
    and Responsibility within Boundaries 
Monitoring and oversight of local governments is an area of concern in both 
federal and unitary countries alike.  For example, the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 1996 (Section 139(1) (b)) provides for a disbandment of local 
government in the event of failure to (i) “maintain national standards or meet 
minimum standards of service”; (ii) “prevent actions prejudicial to the interests of 
another municipality or the nation as a whole”; and (iii) “maintain economic unity”.  
It further provides for withholding of tax shares and transfers for non-compliance  Governing for Results 
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with tax effort (Section 227(2)). The fulfillment of constitutional obligations 
regarding these provisions require a significant and superior evaluation capacity at 
provincial and national levels. Evaluative measures that can assist in this oversight 
include requirement of annual commercial corporate audit of local governments; 
fiscal capacity measurement using a common yardstick i.e. equalisation of municipal 
assessments; greater emphasis on formula grants over project grants in provincial-
local transfers; greater emphasis on public-private-civil society partnership in public 
provision; opinion polls on service standards and citizen satisfaction; and 
performance ratings of local governments based upon outputs, outcomes and citizen 
satisfaction. 
 
9.  SOME LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The following important lessons for governance reforms in developing 
countries can be distilled from a review of past experiences. 
  • Global institutional  evolution is out of step with the pace of globalisation and 
thereby making the developing countries most vulnerable to the whims of 
global markets. The void created by globalisation in international regulation 
and oversight has adverse economic and social consequences for most 
developing nations. An urgent attention is needed to develop and/or adapt 
global institutions and regimes to fill this void. In the meanwhile, developing 
countries might have to resort to “sanding the wheels” of global market to 
limit external shocks.    
  • Development of national strategies for economic and social risk management 
is critical to limit fall-outs from globalisation. Economic risk management 
includes policies to maintain a positive net worth for the government and 
appropriate regulatory framework for private sector and financial market 
operations. Social risk management calls for an accelerated development of 
social safety nets.   
  •  Periodic review of jurisdictional assignments is essential to realign 
responsibilities with changing economic and political realities. With 
globalisation and localisation, national government’s direct role in 
stabilisation and macroeconomic control is likely to diminish over time but 
its role in social protection, education, training, skills enhancement, 
coordination and oversight is expected to increase as regimes and sub-
national governments assume enhanced roles in some of its areas of 
traditional responsibility. Constitutional and legal systems and institutions 
must be amenable to timely adjustments to adapt to changing circumstances.  
  •  Enabling environment for decentralisation i.e. institutions of citizen 
participation and accountability must be addressed in any serious reform of Anwar Shah 
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fiscal systems. These elements have not been sufficiently addressed in most 
reform efforts.   
  • Changes in bureaucratic culture to bring accountability for results is critical 
to a reform of governance in developing countries. Experience shows that 
bureaucracy never reforms itself and therefore building political commitment 
and support is essential to introduce ROME in these countries. 
  •  Civil service reform is critical to the success of a decentralisation 
programme. Such a reform must ensure that the Centre has no direct say in 
the recruitment and promotions of civil servants, other than overseeing that 
standards of transparency and fairness are met at the sub-national levels and 
that wages of sub-national services must be competitive with the central 
government. Further, civil service incentive structure should reward service 
orientation and performance and discourage command and control and rent-
seeking. This can be accomplished through performance contracts, stay-with-
it culture, recognition of specialised skills and evaluation systems that link 
performance, rewards and budgeting. 
  • Traditional administrative capacity matters should not be considered as an 
impediment to decentralisation.  Administrative capacity to develop and 
maintain modern organisational practices such as budgeting, auditing and 
accounting systems is no doubt important but should not be considered as a 
barrier to decentralisation provided citizen participation and transparency in 
decision-making is ensured. This is because technical capacity can be 
borrowed from supportive higher level governments and elsewhere. 
  • Asymmetric  decentralisation  as provided under the Indonesian 
decentralisation programme and under provincial local government 
ordinances in Pakistan offers a thoughtful approach to decentralisation.  
Regardless of the availability of help from higher level governments, lack of 
institutional capacity should never be considered as an excuse not to 
decentralise. Instead, an objective programme of decentralisation which 
recognises the nature and type of local government, its clientele and its fiscal 
capacity can be developed and various local governments can be assigned 
differential powers by taking into account the above mentioned factors as 
was done in Pakistan in the past and more systematically being done in 
Indonesia by rating each local government. 
  • A major separation of spending and taxing decisions leads to lack of 
accountability in the public sector.  In Mexico, South Africa and Pakistan, 
federal revenue sharing transfers finance up to 99 percent of expenditures in 
some provinces. This de-linking of taxing and spending responsibilities have 
led to accountability problems at the provincial levels.  In the event of such 
de-linking, role of conditional (conditional on standards of services and Governing for Results 
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access to such services and not on expenditures) block transfers and 
evaluation is worth examining to enhance accountability. 
  • Intergovernmental  transfers in developing countries undermine fiscal 
discipline and accountability while building transfer dependencies that cause 
a slow economic strangulation of fiscally disadvantaged regions.  Properly 
designed intergovernmental transfers on the other hand can enhance 
competition for the supply of public goods, fiscal harmonisation, sub-national 
government accountability and regional equity. Substantial theoretical and 
empirical guidance on the design of these transfers is readily available. The 
design of these transfers must be simple, transparent and consistent with their 
objectives. The experience of Indonesia offers important insights in grant 
design. For example, Indonesia’s  education and health grants use simple and 
objectively quantifiable indicators in allocation of funds and conditions for 
the continued eligibility of these grants emphasise objective standards so as 
to have access to these services. Indonesian grants for public sector wages on 
the other hand, represent an example of not so thoughtful a design as it 
introduces incentives for higher public employment at sub-national levels.  
  • The role of fiscal transfers in enhancing competition for the supply of public 
goods should not be overlooked.  For example, transfers for basic health and 
primary education could be made available to both public and not-for-profit 
private sector on equal basis using as criteria, the demographics of the 
population served, school age population and student enrolments etc. This 
would promote competition and innovation as both public and private 
institutions would compete for public funding. Chile permits Catholic 
schools’ access to public education financing. Canadian provinces allow 
individual residents to choose among public and private schools for the 
receipt of their property tax dollars. Such an option has introduced strong 
incentives for public and private schools to improve their performances and 
be competitive. Such financing options are especially attractive for providing 
greater access to public services in rural areas. 
  • Fiscal rules accompanied by “gate keeper” intergovernmental councils/ 
committees provide a useful framework for fiscal discipline and fiscal policy 
coordination. In this context, one can draw upon industrial countries’ 
experiences with ‘golden rules’, Maastricht type guidelines and ‘common 
budget directives’ to develop country specific guidelines.  To ensure 
voluntary compliance with the guidelines, appropriate institutional 
framework must be developed. Transparency of the budgetary processes and 
institutions, accountability to electorate and general availability of 
comparative data on fiscal positions of all levels of government further 
strengthens fiscal discipline.   Anwar Shah 
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  • The integrity and independence of the financial sector contributes to fiscal 
prudence in the public sector. To ensure such an integrity and independence, 
ownership and preferential access to the financial sector should not be 
available to any level of government. In such an environment capital markets 
and bond rating agencies would provide an effective fiscal policy discipline.     
  • To ensure fiscal discipline, governments at all levels must be made to face 
financial consequences of their decisions. This is possible if the central 
government does not backstop state and local debt and the central bank does 
not act as a lender of last resort to the central government. 
  • Societal norms and consensus on roles of various levels of governments and 
limits to their authorities are vital for the success of decentralised decision-
making.  In the absence of such norms and consensus, direct central controls 
do not work and intergovernmental gaming leads to dysfunctional 
constitutions. 
  • Tax decentralisation is a pre-requisite for sub-national credit market access. 
In countries with highly centralised tax bases, unrestrained credit market 
access by sub-national governments poses a risk for macro stabilisation 
policies of  the national government as the private sector anticipates a higher 
level government bailout in the event of default and does not discount the 
risks of such lending properly. 
  • Higher level institutional assistance may be needed for financing local 
capital projects. This assistance can take the form of establishing municipal 
finance corporations run on commercial principles to lower the cost of 
borrowing by using the superior credit rating of the higher level government 
and municipal rating agencies to determine credit worthiness. 
  • An internal common market is best preserved by constitutional guarantees. 
National governments in developing countries have typically failed in this role. 
  • Finally, contrary to a common misconception, a developing country institutional 
environment calls for a greater degree of decentralisation and more rapid 
implementation of ROME than needed for an industrialised country. For an 
efficient working of a centralised bureaucracy, advanced information gathering 
and transmittal networks, an efficient and dedicated civil service, and well 
developed institutions of citizen participation and accountability are needed. This 
is possible in the setting of an industrialised country environment. A more 
primitive public sector environment is more suited to a decentralised form of 
governance with focus on bottoms up accountability for results. This is because 
information requirements and transaction costs are minimised by moving the 
decision-making closer to people who are affected by those decisions. Closeness 
also serves to enhance better participation, preference matching for public 
services, transparency and greater accountability. 
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1. 
I very much agree with Mr Shah’s proposition that the state has become too 
small for the big things and too big for the small things. Let us take the first half of 
the proposition “too small for the big things”. Certain types of action should now be 
performed by global institutions. But these global institutions are not here, perhaps 
not yet. We have liberalised trade, we have freedom of trade in goods and services 
and free capital and technology flows, but we have not created the global institutions 
to deal with the fallout of these problems. Some people here have talked about the 
lag of morality behind institutions. I think the problem is much more one of the lag 
of institutions behind technology and behind the liberalisation of trade and capital 
flows. I would like to illustrate the need for global institutions by one example. We 
are now playing negative sum games in which everyone loses. Japan, with a large 
current account surplus, now invests largely in the capital richest countries of the 
world, in the United States and Europe, at the risk of devaluation and inflation. We 
have large unemployment and underutilised industrial capacity in the OECD 
countries, particularly of Europe, which is a clear waste. And we have underutilised, 
unskilled, and semi-skilled manpower in the developing world. Now if we could 
recycle the Japanese current account surpluses to the capital-hungry countries of the 
developing world instead of to the capital-richest countries of Europe and America, 
that would be in everybody’s interest. It would be in everyone’s interest to have a 
global institution, a global investment trust, which would carry multilateral 
government guarantees of the surpluses against devaluation and perhaps inflation. It 
would be of interest to the Japanese who would have safe investment because they 
would be guaranteed. It would be in the interest of the European countries, which 
now suffer from large-scale unemployment, because most of this money would be 
spent on the exports of the OECD countries and it would remove the balance-of-
payments constraint on their expansion and their full employment policies. It would 
clearly be in the interest of the developing countries, like Pakistan, which are greatly 
in need of capital and which would benefit from this additional capital. And it would 
be in the interest of the world, which could resume higher growth without being 
worried by running into balance-of-payments difficulties. 
Three types of surplus, now wasted, would be brought together in the interest 
of world expansion; the current account surpluses of Japan, the surplus industrial 
capacity and skilled manpower of the rich countries, and the surplus underutilised 
manpower of the developing countries. I could go on talking about similar 
institutions such as the need for a global central bank which would provide liquidity 
for global trade or a global environmental protection agency which would coordinate 
efforts to look after the global environment. Again we are now playing a negative Paul P. Streeten  426
sum game because we do not have global institutions to look after issues like global 
warming, the pollution of the air and oceans, or biodiversity. A global institution for 
migration of people, for commodity price stabilisation, for coordination of large-
scale investments, for global health problems, would all be desirable. I could go on. 
And I do not mean more international bureaucrats with glass-plated buildings and 
coifed secretaries, but rules and norms. Some of the functions could be taken on by 
existing institutions. So much about the first half of what Mr Shah quite rightly 
regrets: that we do not have global institutions to correct for the fact that the nation 
state has become too small for large thing. 
Now let us look at the other half. There are a lot of interesting remarks in the 
paper on the need for decentralisation with which I agree. But there are also points 
where I would disagree. I detect an excessively romantic, excessively glamorous idea 
of the decentralisation of government. 
May I remind you that here in Pakistan, in the 1960s, you had a form of 
decentralisation to what were then called Basic Democracies. But this did not give 
more power to oppressed poor peasants, but to the big local landlords who continued 
to grind the faces of the poor, even more than they had before. What one would need 
is a combination of central government action with empowerment of the poor. The 
poor in Pakistan would then have had countervailing power against the local élites, 
who otherwise took over the decentralised government. If in the USA you were 
concerned with the fate of the poor blacks in Mississippi, you would not delegate 
power to the state of Mississippi. You would go in for central legislation and a 
powerful Supreme Court and at the same time empower the poor blacks of 
Mississippi. 
Another difficulty about decentralisation is that it can lead to greater regional 
inequalities. Again, central action is needed to correct for these. Rather than cry 
“decentralise!” we should ask which decisions should be taken at which level and in 
which sequence. If you intend to decentralise, you should not confine it to local 
government but also decentralise by mobilising the civil society. NGOs can 
contribute to more popular participation. 
On globalisation, an additional point needs to be made. What has happened is 
not full globalisation, but partial globalisation of the rich and powerful in the 
developing countries. This globalisation, this very partial global integration of the 
élites, has led to national disintegration. The élites in countries like Pakistan or 
Bangladesh or India have their medical and surgical treatment in the clinics of the 
rich countries of the world. They send their children to the schools and universities in 
the rich countries. They spend their holidays and do their shopping in the rich 
countries. They invest their money in the stock exchanges of the rich countries. 
Interest in capacity-building for local, domestic social services, for local schools in, 
say, Pakistan, or for local health services lags; these get neglected in the process. In 
this way, international (partial) integration leads to national disintegration. Comments  427
Another point of concern is the “brain drain”, the emigration of professional, 
educated manpower to the rich countries. Pakistan suffers a lot from such brain 
drain. But more important and neglected is another aspect. In order to prevent even 
more skilled manpower from emigrating, you have to pay them something not too 
much out of line of what they would get abroad. At the same time, the frontiers 
abroad are closed to the unskilled workers who are in surplus supply. As a result, 
egalitarian incomes policies in countries like Bangladesh or Pakistan become 
impossible. Once again, partial global integration (of the élites) leads to national 
disintegration. 
 







Paul Streeten in his incisive comments made important points with respect to the 
danger of strengthening the power of local landlords through decentralisation and also 
the prospects of increased regional disparities resulting from devolution of power to the 
regional level. When you look beyond the excitement of current globalisation, it is clear 
that perhaps the greatest, the most intense form of globalisation that the world has 
known is the one that started when the Industrial Revolution matured and you had a 
globalised process of capital accumulation within the context of colonialism. In the 
period from 1817 to 1940, there was the greatest export of capital from Europe to the 
rest of the world, and equally the greatest transfer of profits from the developing world 
to the developed world in that period. There was probably an unprecedented 
restructuring of the economies of many of the developing countries as they converted 
from self-sufficient producers to exporters of raw-materials. There was also the 
restructuring of society and culture. So when one is talking about globalisation, I think 
one needs to exercise a certain caution and not present it as a completely new 
phenomenon. 
However, having said that, clearly, globalisation in the contemporary period has 
a number of rather interesting features which distinguish it from the earlier period, and 
which also ask for a new kind of global and local action. It is obvious that the 
magnitude of capital transfers has become very large and the speed of such transfers has 
become extremely fast. Similar is the speed of transfer of new kinds of product, which 
often does not have any weight and does not occupy any space—the electronic 
products, very high-value knowledge-intensive products which may cross the country 
very quickly. 
Then, there is the role that skilled person power can play in changing the 
destinies of the countries, and the way this skilled manpower enters the highly mobile, 
almost abstract new commodities, things like software. 
Now, one of the major consequence of these particular features in the 
contemporary world is that globalisation has tremendously increased the influence of 
certain countries. At the same time, it has damaged a large number of people in the 
developing world, as we witness the phenomenon of mass poverty in the 20th century. 
It has marginalised 50 percent of the world population that lives in the large poor 
*The above comments are the edited version of an oral presentation by the commentator as 





countries. It is really the global institutions and the structure of global economic system 
that I am concerned about. When one is talking about building new institutions at the 
national level, one needs to point out that new institutions perhaps also need to be built 
at the multinational level to come to grips with national phenomena. In this regard, two 
obvious issues arise. One is the phenomenon of debt servicing. Debt servicing perhaps 
has become more important now than at any other time in the history of the global 
economy. Debt servicing has become a major mechanism of transferring both financial 
and real resources from the developing to the developed world. I say “real” in the sense 
that is illustrated by the following example. Take sub-Saharan Africa and large parts of 
Pakistan and India. When these countries are induced to increase their foreign exchange 
earnings through the export of agricultural raw materials, they forcibly use their very 
fragile soils more intensively. And when it has been done over time, it has rendered 
large areas of the developing world’s soil infertile. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, 
we find the impact of famine as a result of overuse and depletion of soil affecting some 
35 million people. We have a similar acute condition in Pakistan today, where you have 
declining input productivities in agriculture, and declining use of major crops, both of 
which phenomena are rooted in the loss of nutrients in the topsoil. So this phenomenon 
of globalisation, which, while it is being celebrated, also has a down side, and we really 
need to think of building multilateral institutions which could reverse these transfers of 
both financial and real resources. At the moment, the major multilateral institutions that 
we have in place are designed to do exactly the opposite. They are designed to transfer 
resources out of these poor countries rather than bring them back in.  
Paul Streeten’s proposal is an extremely timely one that we need to build 
perhaps new global environmental protection agencies, and divert the Japanese balance-
of-payments surplus to the developing world; certainly. The other point that is 
interesting in Dr [Anwar] Shah’s paper is that national governments focus much more 
on skill development and on enhancing the skills of the labour force. In a world where 
most value-added products are consumed in the advanced industrial world, this 
development would really amount to transferring  scarce capital resources partly 
through brain drain and partly through provision of this knowledge as inputs into 
products which are consumed in the West. So, it would become a mechanism of 
transferring scarce capital resources from the developing to the developed world unless 
you create institutions within the national economy through which the secondary 
multiplier effects of skill development and skill use could accrue to the developing 
world. Nadeem-ul-Haq has done some work in this field, on how the phenomenon of  
brain drain can actually play the role of capital transfers in growing inequalities between 
these countries. We need to focus on this, and on building institutions through which 
developing countries can enjoy the secondary multiplier effects of skill development Akmal Hussain  430 
within their own economies and for their own people.  
Another issue that I think requires a comment on Dr [Anwar] Shah’s otherwise 
extremely fertile and provocative paper is the idea that liberalisation is sort-of 
negatively correlated with welfare expenditures in a broad sense of the term. The point 
is: Is there an institutional basis for this negative correlation at the global level? If you 
look at the history of the advice which the World Bank and the IMF have rendered over 
the years through their conditionality programmes, it is very clear that they requested 
many developing countries to reduce the budget deficit through the reduction of public 
expenditure. Historically, these programmes have not been accompanied by proposals 
on how to accelerate the GDP growth. They may be coming to it now, late in the day, 
but historically the real emphasis has been on the reduction of public expenditure. Now, 
given the power structure in many of the developing countries, a proposal for reducing 
public expenditure really transpires into reducing development expenditure; because, 
given the sources of power of the élites in these countries, there has been a reluctance to 
reduce non-productive expenditure on their own bureaucracy, military, and so on. So 
they ended up reducing development expenditure. If we look at Pakistan, for example, 
our development expenditure as a percentage of the GDP has declined from something 
like above-7 percent in the 1970s, to less than 7 percent in the 1980s. It is less than 3 
percent now. As economists, we often under-estimate the impact of this reduction on 
employment and poverty. Historically, the public sector, regardless of being inefficient 
and incompetent, has been a major source of employment generation. We need to talk 
about changing the structure of power in these developing countries in such a way that 
they can reduce the budget deficit through the reduction of non-productive rather than 
productive expenditure. And this brings me to perhaps what I think is the essential 
absence in the paper—the issue of power. When we talk of things like Result-oriented 
Management and Evaluation systems, and look at them in terms of a set of ideas, or as a 
concept, it is an extremely attractive proposition. But when one is looking at 
implementation, you come face to face with the power structure, i.e., point to it for 
exactly the opposite service considerations from the ones which Dr Shah proposed in 
Rome (Result-oriented Management and Evaluation). If you look at the past experience 
of Pakistan, and many other developing countries like India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, 
our system is predicated on channelling state funds to rent-seekers, and this is done 
through a notion of power which is predicated  on creating patron-client relations.  The 
basis of patron-client relations is the basis of establishing and maintaining power. So, to 
propose that you set up something like a Result-oriented Management System, under 
these circumstances, is to threaten the world power to produce and reproduce in these 
countries. That is why the whole issue of power structure needs to be looked at. I shall 
not go into the two aspects of decentralisation which Prof. [Paul] Streeten dealt with so 





which shows a strong correlation of governance quality indices and decentralisation. He 
is using this evidence to bring forth the argument that you should have decentralisation 
in the abstract, completely ignoring the power aspect of it. I would like to see the 
sample on the basis of which the correlation has been drawn. If Dr Shah had selected a 
sample of countries where there was a symmetric local power structure and 
decentralisation occurred, my suspicion is that the correlation in such countries would 
move the other way.  
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